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Introduction 
In 1985 the Scottish Office celebrated its centenary. The official
commemorative volume, 'The Thistle and the Crown', was written by John
Gibson, a retired civil servant, and conveyed the agreeable sense of a
government department proud of its history and stable in its relationship with
the nation it represented and the British government of which it was a part( I).
George Younger, Secretary of State from 1979 to 1986, personified the
tradition in the Office in which Conservative ministers were amiable grandees
and Labour ones models of Scottish responsibility and rectitude. But by the
end of the decade, ten years of Thatcherism were taking their toll, and the
Scottish Office was facing up to its structural weakness in the government of
the United Kingdom. Although there is a wide range of territorially 
deconcentrated functions of central government - especially social security
and employment services - they are administered in a very centralised way, 
and in most cases outside the control of the three territorial departments- for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which are part of the British civil 
service and act in effect as agents of a British state partly denied political 
consent in the nations they administer. 
The instabilities in the British structure of territorial government had 
attracted such considerable political and academic interest in the 1970s that the 
failure of 'assemblies' in Northern Ireland, Scotland (both with Jaw-making 
powers) and Wales came as a shock. Northern Ireland's coalition 
administration of Protestant and Catholic political forces collapsed in 1974. 
Scotland's and Wales's assemblies were never elected. Perhaps it is now 
necessary to repeat that the proposals of the Scotland Act 1978 received a 52 
per cent majority in a referendum in 1979 but this was insufficient in terms of a 
clause inserted in the Act by opponents of devolution that required the 
affirmative vote of 40 per cent of the total electorate for the assembly to 
proceed. The Welsh proposals were rejected by 80 per cent of those voting. 
Soon after the referendums a Conservative government was elected which is 
strongly unionist in its attitude to the government of Scotland and Wales and, 
unlike the 1970s, has seen no need to make new constitutional proposals for 
these nations. 
This chapter traces how the Scottish Office has coped with this change of 
political circumstances and the Joss of salience for Scottish government. It has 
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had to live with the political context of Thatcherism; the framework of public 
expenditure which it sustains; and the impact of the various management 
initiatives of the Conservative government since 1979. The general theme is 
that of instability and uncertainty caused by a lack of political consent in 
Scotland to the patterns and practices of British government as they had 
developed by the 1980s. 
The Organisational Profile of the Scottish Office 
The Scottish Office has developed since 1885 as a collection of functions 
devolved from United Kingdom departments to the authority of the Secretary 
of State for Scotland(2). These functions have never been comprehensive in 
scope nor defined in any constitutional sense. Its employees number less than 
two per cent of the public sector workforce in Scotland and (in 1987) only 16 
per cent of the civil servants, most of the rest working in social security, 
employment and defence departments<3l. Because most of the main functions 
the Scottish Office supervises (education, housing and social work services) 
are delivered by local authorities, it spends only 40 per cent of the budget for 
which it is responsibJe(4). It is recruited and paid on the same basis as the rest of 
the civil service and in its work practices is very similar to the rest of Whitehall. 
But it does retain a Scottish identity, and the great majority of its officials are 
Scottish. As of 1990, only one of the top seven officials (Graham Hart, 
secretary of the Scottish Home and Health Department) was imported from an 
English department, and the French concept of 'pantouflage' - the 
parachuting-in of senior officials from the national capital- is rare. 
The Scottish Office is a multi-functional department: despite moves in the 
1980s to create a corporate identity, the five Scottish departments (Agriculture 
and Fisheries; Development; Education; Home and Health; Industry) remain 
formally distinct. This species is now out of favour in British government. In 
the 1970s, conglomerate departments (Health and Social Security, Trade and 
Industry, Environment) were created in order to aid policy planning across 
related areas. All have since been broken up or lost some functions. The 
Thatcher government has shown a particular reluctance to experiment with 
the machinery of government. This tends to leave the Scottish Office as a 
territorial interest group and has weakened its former role as an innovator in 
public administration, which had become apparent in fields like urban policy 
and social work in the 1960s. 
This profile produces two dimensions of tension. Functionally, the Office 
has incomplete responsibilities but at the same time exercises a lobbying and 
advocacy role inside central government on behalf of Scottish interests; it is 
meant to be more than the sum of its parts. Organisationally, it has to conform 
to Whitehall management rules but is territorially distant and different in 
scope from other departments. The degree of tension is to a large extent 
affected by the political salience of Scotland in United Kingdom politics. In the 
1970s it was high as the Labour Government sought to retain its Scottish 
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support in order to protect its slim parliamentary majority; in the 1980s it has 
been weak, with 357 of the 375 Conservative members elected in 1987 
representing English seats. 
The Political Context 
The dominant political theme in Scotland in the 1980s is the relative 
weakness of the Conservative Party. In 1979 it gained 31 per cent of the 
Scottish vote, in 1983 28 per cent and in 1987 24 per cent; the overall 
Conservative vote in Great Britain was stable at 43-45 per cent. Scottish 
Conservative MPs numbered 22 out of71 in 1979,21 out of72 in 1983, and no 
more than 10 out of 72 in 1987- the scale of the losses in that year being caused 
by tactical voting for the best-placed opposition parties<5l. The Conservative 
vote in Scotland was in 1987 half that in the Midlands and South of England 
outside Greater London. The main source of increased Conservative support 
in England- the skilled working class- remains loyal to the Labour Party in 
Scotland<6l. The Conservatives control none of the 8 regional authorities, and 
only 3 of the 53 districts. 
Two tendencies became steadily more apparent during the 1980s. The 
first is the gradual de-legitimisation of Conservatism in Scotland. In the 1950s 
it did better than Labour in Scotland adjusted for class<7l; until1970 post-war 
Conservative governments had a plurality of Scottish votes or seats. By 1990 
the electoral arithmetic made it impossible for the Conservatives to rely on 
their United Kingdom mandate in Scotland in anything other than a formal 
constitutional sense. The second is the oscillation between the high influence 
of Scottish MPs during a Labour government and weakness during a 
Conservative one. The Parliamentary Labour Party in 1990 is 21 per cent 
Scottish (49 out of 230 MPs, including four influential Shadow Cabinet 
members - Gordon Brown, Robin Cook, Donald Dewar and John Smith -
whose solid demeanours personify the soundest traditions of a Scottish 
upbringing); the meagre ranks of Scottish Conservative MPs are scarcely 
enough to fill all the ministerial posts at the Scottish Office, a point emphasised 
by the use of English MPs (David Maclean and Michael Fallon) as the Scottish 
whip. 
The Scottish National Party's volatile electoral fortunes serve as a 
barometer for the system-disturbance impact of Scotland on the British 
political scene. Having overcome the factional conflict of the early 1980s it re-
established itself in the mid-1980s as an anti-Thatcher political force, and won 
three seats from the Conservatives in 1987 though losing two to Labour; its 
tendency to take seats from Conservative rather than Labour was confirmed in 
subsequent regional elections. In late 1988 it won the safe seat of Glasgow 
Govan from Labour in a by-election and briefly surged to 32 per cent in the 
opinion polls, its best figure since 1977. This soon subsided as Labour 
reasserted its national position, but the SNP did gain 26 per cent ofthe vote in 
the European elections of June 1989. What seems to have been happening was 
176 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1991 
the use of a tactical option by the Scottish electorate to send a message to the 
London-based political world in the most effective language available but one 
to which it is difficult for civil servants to relate. 
This produces an uncomfortable political context for the Scottish Office. 
As civil servants, their training and ethos emphasise the legitimacy of their 
service of the government in office as an expression of the political process. 
Some territorial variations in support for the governing party can be 
accommodated without difficulty, especially if changes of government are 
frequent, but long-term divergence is a problem. Scottish Office civil servants 
are noted for a strong adherence to the constitutional proprieties and 
unwillingness to seek a high profile, but they are inhabitants of a Scottish 
political culture that disapproves deeply of the Conservative Party and is 
frustrated in its efforts to give political expression to that judgement. 
This tension becomes most evident when the Scottish Office is called upon 
to play its lobbying role. In the 1960s and 1970s this proved effective when 
locational decisions were being made by government (on industrial investment 
and the location of government offices). In the 1980s the Scottish Office was 
forced into a more defensive posture as it sought to protect indigenous Scottish 
industry from takeover. It could hardly help seeming to stand against the free-
market ideology of the Thatcher government, and it had also to associate itself 
with Scottish local government - especially Strathclyde region, which covers 
nearly half the Scottish population and is the largest local authority in Britain, 
running its own successful lobbying operation to attract European Community 
funds. Sometimes battles were won, as when the Royal Bank of Scotland in 
1981, and Scottish and Newcastle Breweries in 1989 were protected against 
foreign takeover; sometimes they were lost as when the Distillers Company 
was taken over by Guinness in 1986. Whatever the outcome, the Industry 
Department became freebooters within British government, leading the 
'Scottish lobby' as it came to be called, but not accountable to a local 
legislature. What accountability there was to the Westminster parliament was 
weak but not always benign- as when the Public Accounts Committee of the 
House of Commons in 1990 criticised some of the procedures of the 'Locate in 
Scotland' bureau, which seeks industrial investment<8l. 
A yet more serious contextual problem arose after 1987. Traditionally, 
the Scottish Office has been an emollient, consensus-building department, its 
Secretaries of State reactors rather than innovators or ideologues. The 
adaptation of British policy to fit Scottish circumstances sometimes permitted 
its amelioration to what would be found acceptable by Scottish opinion. 
George Younger fitted comfortably into this mould, and did slow up the 
privatisation of the Scottish public sector; Malcolm Rifkind, has sharper policy 
instincts but stands basically in the same tradition. But after 1987 it became 
difficult to justify the 'de-Thatcherisation' of Conservative policy in Scotland 
on grounds of political expediency; it had manifestly failed to yield a political 
dividend and, having been pushed to its limit, was rapidly replaced by a 'going 
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for broke' strategy in which there was no point in restraint. This has been 
personified by Michael Forsyth, appointed a junior minister at the Scottish 
Office in charge of education and health in 1987, and chairman of the Scottish 
Conservative Party in 1989. Apparently having a direct relationship to Mrs 
Thatcher that outflanked that of Secretary of State Rifkind, he presided over 
substantial reforms to state education and health on the principles of the 
'internal market' which ran in parallel to those in England. This broke with the 
tradition of separate Scottish administration of these areas which had led to 
somewhat different structures and policies. Privatisation policies have also 
been brought into line with those in England and by 1991 will deprive the 
Scottish Office of most of the nationalised industries it sponsors in electriticy 
and transport. 
In one rather notorious respect Scotland was the leading edge of 
Thatcherist policy - local government finance, especially the community 
charge or poll tax introduced in Scotland in 1989, one year ahead of England. 
This was partly accidental: the small number of top-tier local authorities in 
Scotland had prompted legislative powers to control their spending selectively 
in 1982, two years ahead of England, and the readjustment in Scotland only in 
1985 of property valuations on which the rates were levied was the 
precipitating factor that led to the replacement of rates on domestic property 
by the poll tax. But there was a clear theme of using Scotland as a test-bed to 
expose administrative complications in the scheme. Some English Conserva-
tive MPs who had helped to enact the Scottish legislation in 1987 tried to 
prevent the same policies being extended to England; concessions and 
transitional reliefs secured for England had to be extended retrospectively to 
Scotland. In the budget of March 1990, a relaxation of the rules for eligibility to 
the partial rebate of the charge for those on very low incomes was initially not 
to be applied to the Scottish charges paid in 1989-90; after two days of vigorous 
Scottish complaint, the cheque book was opened to the clear discomfiture of 
Thatcher and Rifkind. What was striking was the abandonment of any 
intellectual defence of uniform rebate rules across Britain in favour of 
discourse based upon political weight. 
What we see here is the bureaucratic problem of aligning territorial 
policies in a unitary state combining with the governmental problem of 
winning consent and compliance. In plainer terms, the Scots and the Scottish 
Office became a nuisance. In its dealings with the policy communities in 
education and health, the Office is similarly forced to be the ambassador of 
policies easily condemned as alien to a distinctive Scottish tradition that it once 
sought to maintain. It is not certain that the traditional formulae of ministerial 
responsibility can contain the tensions between 'Scottish' and 'British' 
sensibilities within officials themselves, within the Office as a whole, and in its 
relations with outside bodies. 
A final element of the political context lies in the personalities of officials. 
The appointment of the two senior tiers of officials (Grades 1 and 2) lies with 
178 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1991 
the Prime Minister, and it has been suggested that Mrs Thatcher has sought to 
exercise an inordinate influence in the appointment of certain personalities to 
the ranks of a service she has been able to observe for over ten years. In 
practice this probably amounts to little more than her preference for 
articulate, forthright and politically aware officials, often rather younger than 
the normal age for senior posts. In the Scottish Office, she inherited as 
Permanent Secretary Sir William Fraser, a respected and adroit personality 
with a more comfortable public demeanour than is often found in senior 
officials; he served until 1988, when he became Principal of Glasgow 
University. The pattern of senior promotions during his tenure caused no great 
surprise, but his successor did, as he was the most junior of the second-grade 
departmental secretaries, Russell Hillhouse, who had over ten years to serve 
before retirement age. Speculation that this was a Thatcher appointment was 
fuelled by the passing-over of an eminently suitable 'traditional' candidate, 
William Reid, secretary of the Scottish Home and Health Department, whose 
high standing in Whitehall circles was confirmed when he subsequently 
became the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, or 
Ombudsman. A further noteworthy move in 1990- that of James Scott from 
the Industry Department to head the Scottish Development Agency- was not 
accompanied by any transfer in the opposite direction. 
There is no ~firm evidence available about the making of senior 
appointments and relations between officials and ministers, but they are not 
quite the same in the 1980s as hitherto. What can be suggested is that Malcolm 
Rifkind stands in a tradition of close and respectful relationships between 
ministers and civil servants, about which he has written during his earlier 
service as a junior minister(9); that Michael Forsyth stands somewhat outside it 
and has a reputation as a demanding minister, sceptical about arguments of 
infeasibility and successful at driving policies through; and that the 
bureaucracy as a whole has found it difficult to replace the model of alternating 
governments substantially in tune with Scottish opinion with one that 
accommodates the political imperatives of third-term conservatism. For 
harder evidence on the Scottish Office's performance in the 1980s, we can turn 
to the bureaucratic level, and the management of resource allocation and 
managerial innovation. 
The Resource Framework 
Like most bureaucracies at intermediate levels of government, the 
Scottish Office has become associated with the maintenance of high resource 
inputs to its territory. Available evidence (table 1) shows a level of identifiable 
public expenditure per head in Scotland (only 60 per cent of which is 
supervised by the Scottish Office) consistently about 21-24 per cent above the 
United Kingdom average; this is higher than Wales but less than Northern 
Ireland. There is no comparable official calculation for the English regions. 
The mechanisms of allocation militate against territorial convergence within 
the United Kingdom, for they apportion changes in British spending on a 
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Table 1: Identifiable Public Expenditure per head under the Thatcher 
Government- Index UK = 100 
Scotland England Wales Northern 
Ireland 
1979-80 121.7 95.6 104.9 142.5 
1980-81 122.0 95.8 105.1 144.4 
1981-82 124.2 95.5 105.4 145.8 
1982-83 122.0 95.8 106.2 141.0 
1983-84 122.0 95.7 108.5 142.8 
1984-85 121.0 95.9 106.3 144.5 
1985-86 121.8 95.8 105.7 146.4 
1986-87 121.8 95.6 108.5 146.2 
1987-88 123.1 95.4 109.4 146.0 
1988-89 123.3 95.0 109.4 159.4* 
* includes a one-off industrial subsidy; disregarding that, 148.5. 
Note: data since 1984-5 are a consistent series; before that, there are certain 
changes in coverage and classification. 
Source: Treasury and Civil Service Committee, House of Commons Sixth 
Report 1988-89, The Presentation of Information on Public Expenditure (HC 
217) p36; House of Commons Hansard 19 December 1989 col179-90. 
formula basis loosely linked to population: under this so-called 'Barnett 
formula' (named after the Chief Secretary to the Treasury at the time it was 
introduced in 1978), most components of Scottish expenditure receive 10 per 
cent of any changes in the corresponding United Kingdom figure. 
To assess these figures we must look at the methodology of 'need' and 
'excess' that underlies them; the political salience of the figures that are 
quoted; and the political and financial cost of changing the pattern they reveal. 
On the first point, we have no more recent evidence than the Treasury Needs 
Assessment Study of the mid-1970s, which suggested that Scotland 'needs' 
more spending than England but beyond this has been able to secure a 
disproportionately high resource input in certain areas, especially health< 10l. 
The published figures are not comprehensive (for instance, defence spending 
is not apportioned between parts of the United Kingdom) and are in some 
respects misleading, for they do not take account of tax expenditures (like the 
much greater per capita mortgage interest relief in England), the pattern of 
private provision, and variations in socio-economic structure(ll)_ But even 
though they may be challenged in an analytical sense, their salience in political 
debate is hard to undermine. 
These data are cause for ambivalence on the part of the Scottish Office: is 
it better to conceal them to avoid political vulnerability to English accusations 
of unfair treatment, or to proclaim them as evidence of the success of ministers 
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in securing extra expenditure? The trend has been towards the latter. The 
figures are publicised more widely than hitherto (for instance, in the annual 
Public Expenditure White Paper) but they remain statistical summaries rather 
than planning targets. It has become noticeable that English Conservative 
MPs, including some who are prominent at Scottish question time at 
Westminster, have begun to cite the figures as a warning against Scottish 
ingratitude. In domestic Scottish politics, an important comparison is with 
territorial expenditure in Scotland and Wales. Here, the data are very hard to 
interpret as the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices have somewhat 
different responsibilities; it is not clear whether one Secretary of State has 
been more successful than another. Peter Walker, the Secretary of State for 
Wales from 1987 until his retirement in May 1990, did have a pork-barrel 
mentality and succeeded in giving the impression that he had extracted more 
from the Treasury, a contention borne out by the expenditure trends 
summarised in table 2: Welsh Office spending increased by nearly 10 per cent 
in real terms between 1984 and 1989 while that ofthe Scottish Office fell. 
Table 2: Public Expenditure within the responsibility of the Secretaries of State 
for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in real terms, 1984-89 - £m at 
1988-89 prices 
Scotland Wales Northern 
Ireland 
1984-85 8,604 3,253 5,000 
1985-86 8,357 3,224 5,022 
1986-87 8,486 3,410 5,119 
1987-88 8,375 3,497 5,209 
1988-89 8,468 3,567 5,465 
%change -1.6 +9.7 +8.4 
Source: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1990-91 to 1992-3 vol 21 (Cm 
1021, 1990) table 21.2.5 
A more important issue is the dynamics of changing expenditure shares. 
The United Kingdom has an unbalanced territorial structure: England has 83 
per cent of the population and 85 per cent of the economic activity, but it has 
no intermediate government and is administered uniformly from London. At 
the same time, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have complex and 
distinctive national identities and demand careful political management if they 
are not to have a destabilising effect on the United Kingdom polity. Hence, the 
gearing ratio of peripheral demands to total expenditure is rather low: it is 
relatively cheap to buy-off protest as long as there is no knock-on to England. 
This approach is most evident in Northern Ireland, whose circumstances are 
now more clearly than ever demarcated from the rest of Britain (for instance, 
the poll tax is not being introduced there, and privatisation has been 
introduced very cautiously). But Scotland has lost ground, since the gearing 
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ratio can equally be applied not to England as a whole, but to a particular 
territorial or functional part of English expenditure: declining industrial areas 
will demand more aid, or areas with high morbidity more health spending. It 
may be politically destabilising to sustain the territorial differential, even 
though the allocation system is stable at the official level and enormously 
convenient to the Scottish Office and the Treasury. 
The Impact of Policy Initiatives and Management Techniques 
The British civil service remains immobile in a sociological sense, 
socialising its members into common attitudes and working practices, but 
important managerial innovations have been imposed upon it in the 1980s. 
These range from the crude (cuts in numbers specified before it is known how 
they are to be achieved) to the over-sophisticated (techniques of financial 
management that threaten to outrun the capacities of officials). They may be 
summed up as a change in culture, moving the civil service from an acceptance 
that its cost and structure were part of the 'costs of democracy' to an interest in 
the nature of tasks and how they are to be performed in an efficient and 
effective way. 
The Scottish Office's culture is predominantly the same as that of any 
other civil service department. This is because it services cabinet and 
parliamentary business in the same style and is in frequent interaction with 
other departments. Personnel management- pay, gradings, promotion rules 
and employee rights- also takes place in common. The result is an identity of 
approach that does not require much cross-posting to sustain it. The 
Scottishness comes in with a sensitivity to issues that might cause Scottish 
ministers embarrassment with domestic Scottish opinion, and a watchfulness 
that Scottish interests do not get overlooked in the Whitehall policy process. 
There must also be a certain nationalistic pride on matters ranging from 
heraldry to sport, which is accepted as entirely legitimate in the British 
political system and tends to get appropriated by politicians, as in Margaret 
Thatcher's 'we in Scotland' phrase used in a 1989 television interview. 
In coping with the so-called efficiency strategy of the Thatcher years, the 
Scottish Office has manoeuvred quietly within the specifications set at the 
centre. It has not been a pioneer as was, for instance, the Department of the 
Environment under Michael Heseltine with its Management Information 
System for Ministers (MINIS) - the Jack of a Secretary of State interested in 
management systems probably being important here. In some matters of 
technique- such as the use of performance indicators in the health service and 
elsewhere- it has clearly lagged behind England. The Office has not seemed 
notably enthusiastic about the changes but has been in a position to respond to 
them because in addition to its policy-making core it has a range of higher-
employment executive tasks (prisons; ancient monuments; museums; 
agricultural advice). These are susceptible to 'hiving-off' into separate 
organisations or the trimming of staff numbers through contracting-out. 
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The target for staff cuts set for the Scottish Office in 1979 was 10 per cent, 
from 11,119 to I 0,000, against the 14 per cent average for all departments. In 
the event both were more than achieved, the Scottish Office falling to 9,800 by 
the target date of 1984. Table 3, drawn on a wider basis to include the minor 
Scottish departments dealing mainly with legal matters, shows that it has not 
fallen further since and that all the territorial departments have been protected 
(the overall decline in the civil service since 1979 being 20 per cent). The small 
number of Scottish Office industrial emgJoyees have fallen 
disproportionately, from 1,005 in 1981 to 724 in 1987 12l. Dunsire and Hood's 
research into published data shows that the Scottish Office attributed the cuts 
to a variety of measures, including the shedding of functions, whereas the 
Welsh and Northern Ireland Office concentrated on 'general streamlining'(13l. 
Given that the numerical target was the main constraint, it is difficult to assess 
the value or effect of measures taken to achieve it. 
Table 3: Personnel Numbers in Scotland, Welsh and Northern Ireland 




















Source: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1990-91 to 1992-3 Vol2 (Cm 
1021, 1990) table 21.3.11 
The other major efficiency measures initially undertaken by the Thatcher 
governfl.lent were the so-called Rayner scrutinies, named after the 
government's first efficiency adviser. These involve one middle-rank official 
preparing a 90-day assessment of an agency or policy problem with the 
presumption that the recommendations are likely to be implemented. The 
Efficiency Unit in the Prime Minister's Office monitors the process to avoid 
departments' choosing soft targets. The Scottish Office has often chosen to 
scrutinise professional and advisory sections or bodies; for instance, one 
scrutiny led to the integration of the administrative and professional teams 
advising social work departments(14l. Its universe of 'non-departmental public 
bodies' is substantial- in 1989, 69 executive and 126 non-executive ones(ts)_ 
The executive bodies are subject to a financial management and policy review 
on a five-year cycle(16l. The biggest spenders among them - the 15 health 
boards- have been brought under tighter central control, especially after the 
appointment in 1989 of a Chief Executive of the National Health Service in 
Scotland. Initiatives since 1987 have produced new 'Thatcherite' agencies 
designed to mobilise private sector initiative- Scottish Homes in housing and 
Scottish Enterprise in economic development and training - and these may 
produce new control problems for the policy-making core of the Scottish 
Office. In their early days the privatisation objectives of the agencies may be 
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enforced too crudely, but once established they may lose any clientelistic 
inhibitions vis-a-vis the Office. 
The Financial Management Initiative, launched in 1982, was designed to 
give the civil service an awareness of the resource implications of their actions, 
and includes better information technology, monitoring of stated performance 
indicators, and a somewhat greater discretion to line managers to plan 
expenditure. In the Scottish Office, a Financial Information and Control 
System (FICS) came into effect in 1984, but a National Audit Office report in 
1986 suggested that the Scottish Office had made a relatively slow start: it 
noted that "the extent and quality of target-setting throughout the Scottish 
Office varied ... the qualit~ and effectiveness of such performance indicators as 
are in use also varied"(17 • A comment of an official that "FMI is useful as a 
cost-awareness exercise but is little more than a pretence at anything else" was 
quoted< 18l. Subsequent progress has been more impressive, at least in the 
formal sense: in 1990-91 budget setting and control is dele~ated through 49 
'group budget holders' to 186 'budget centre managers'<1 . From 1989-90 
running costs provision has been agreed with the Treasury for the three-year 
period of the public expenditure survey on the basis of a Departmental 
Management Plan which relates costs, staff numbers and policy objectives<20l. 
The extent to which managers are thus enabled to initiate significant changes 
in the resources under their command is less evident. 
The most recent innovation facing the Scottish Office is that of Executive 
Agencies. These are designed to be free-standing managerial entities within 
the civil service, whose staff retain civil servant status and the same channels of 
accountability while in theory becoming free of civil service pay restraint. They 
were first proposed in a rapid and thinly-documented scrutiny ('The Next 
Steps') in 1988; twenty have already been set up and in time they could include 
most of the civil service -for instance, all of social security administration is 
being turned into an agency. The agencies are enigmatic beings in that the 
degree of real change from the present management system might be very 
great or very slight and is hard to predict in advance. Each department can 
introduce a further level of confusion by its choice of field and speed. The 
Scottish Office did not figure in the initial list of 12 proposed agencies in 
February 1988, but by April it had added two- the Historic Buildings and 
Monuments Division, and the Department of Registers for Scotland, the 
depository of legal records. The latter, with its 950 employees, achieved 
agency status in April 1990; quite protracted planning work on the other is 
continuing. In May 1990 a third candidate was announced, the Scottish 
Fisheries Protection Service. All three are clearly peripheral to the main 
political task of the Office, and the impression is that agencies will not be a 
primary option of the Scottish Office even in self-contained fields like the 
Prison Service. 
In Dunsire and Hood's terms<21 l, the Scottish Office has chosen the 
cosmetic rather than the conviction route to cutback and change. This is a 
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typical reaction in a department where neither the nature of the work nor the 
personality of the minister prompts a departure from traditional civil service 
styles. What is more difficult is to isolate the territorial effects. Distance itself 
is one, though this has been minimised as telecommunications and data links 
improve through a new integrated telephone system in 1986 and a word 
processing and electronic mail network linking Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
London offices. Any tendency to let Scotland go its own way is 
counterbalanced by the Thatcher government's commitment to 
comprehensive management initiatives in the civil service. As most of the 
change is invisible to the public, there need be little sensitivity to opinion 
within Scotland. The most plausible conclusion is that taken as a whole the 
Scottish Office has maintained its reputation as a cautious, reactive 
department, content with the norms of British public administration, and 
learning to live with what must seem an irresistible tide of management jargon 
from the south. Time will tell whether a cadre of younger officials more 
committed to a managerial culture and a more activist style will come to the 
fore. 
Conclusion 
The Scottish Office had for many years tended to be an expanding part of 
British government, but in the 1980s has had to come to terms with general 
government decline. Denied the intra-governmental reforms that were on 
offer with the devolution proposals of the 1970s, it has further lost some 
organisational freedom of movement in its internal affairs, and has become the 
executive body of a political leadership with serious problems of political 
legitimacy in Scotland. 
This runs counter to the experience in most European countries. In 
France, Spain, Belgium and Italy the political imperative to deconcentration 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s did not prove abortive, and regional 
bureaucrats had important areas of freedom and creativity. In Scotland, the 
territorial bureaucracy was blocked. The Scottish Office's political mandate 
seemed to lack authenticity when compared to that of the regional councils, 
and it was forced into a defensive posture. It had some areas of freedom when 
lobbying for Scottish causes in concert with corporatist interests, but was more 
often left reacting to managerial changes conceived in Whitehall or policy 
changes launched by English Conservatism. The ability of Scotland to resist 
these changes has been limited by the constitutional framework of a unitary 
state. 
In 1981 Malcolm Rifkind wrote in this Yearbook that "the Scottish Office, 
whatever government is in power, always follows the splendid tradition of 
insisting on United Kingdom uniformity when we like what our English 
colleagues are doing and asserting the need for distinctive Scottish solutions 
when we don't like what they are doing"<22l. Now, as Secretary of State for 
Scotland, he finds that tradition less resilient. Under the Conservatives, 
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territorial management has concentrated on England and not, as in the 1970s, 
on the rather small non-English parts of the United Kingdom. The political 
agenda would be transformed by the return of a Labour government, for it 
would be committed more firmly than ever before to legislate for a devolved 
Scottish legislature in its first year of office. For Scottish Office civil servants, 
the shift of paradigm would be even more rapid than in 1974 and 1979, and the 
chance of liberation from Whitehall could easily prove a gratifying path to 
pursue. 
Richard Parry, Lecturer in Social Policy, University of Edinburgh. 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented to the workshop on Local 
and Regional Bureaucracies in European States, European Consortium for 
Political Research joint sessions, Bochum, April1990. 
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